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Norms, Rationality, and Communication: A Reputation Theory
of Social Norms

Law and economics has given birth to another school of thought, law and
(social) norms.1 Family relations tend to be conflict-laden. While parents aspire to
leave an imprint perpetuating their personality and values, children often grow mature
only by opposing to those views. Law and norms has been pretty much mummy’s
darling before going through a phase of defiance.2 Still, many believe that law and
norms has not yet gained a lot of maturity.3 Seemingly, it has not developed much of
a personality beyond the interest in its subject – norms.4 In this paper, I consider one,
perhaps the principal, question to define law and norm’s character. Little surprisingly,
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See generally the commenty by Eric A. Posner, The Signaling Model of Social Norms:

Further Thoughts, 36 U. Rich. L. Rev. 465 (2002); Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers
Social Norms, 27 J. L. S. 537 (1998), and Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and
Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment, 27 J. L. S. 553, 564-565 (1998).
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The latter might be associated with the activist “New Chicago School”, Lawrence Lessig, The

New Chicago School, 27 J. L. S. 661 (1998); Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Big Government, 15
Quinnipiac L. Rev. 147 (1995), Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Col. L. Rev. 903
(1996), particularly at 907 (“norm management”) and 947 et seq., and Dan M. Kahan, Social
Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. L. R. 349 (1997). A recent, well-weighed
assessment can be found in Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 Am. L. & Econ. Rev.
1, 30-42 (2001).
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Recently, skeptical voices made themselves heard. See Robert E. Scott, The Limits Of

Behavioral Theories Of Law And Social Norms, 86 Va. L. R. 1603 (2000). For its limited use in the
theory of the firm see Oliver Hart, Norms and the Theory of the Firm, 149 Penn. L. Rev. 1701 (2001).
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See Eric A. Posner, The Signaling Model of Social Norms: Further Thoughts, 36 U. Rich. L.

Rev. 465, 465 (2002).

it is at the same time a core component of law and economics: I am speaking of
rational choice.5

Law and norms can accept or waive the heritage of rational choice. In this
paper, I undertake to defend rational choice as a solid foundation for positive law and
norms theory. To this end, I propose a reputation theory of social norms. The
reputation theory of social norms avoids assumptions about behavioral traits, preferences, or internal constraints. That is, it does without many assumptions that have
been used to account for social norms, such as the notion of internalization or
normative motivations.6 However, the reputation theory put forward here is even
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For the critique of rational choice in the domain of law and economics itself see Christine Jolls

et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998) and the other
articles compiled in Cass R. Sunstein (ed), Behavioral Law and Economics (2000).
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On internalization, see only Robert D. Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? : An

Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 Va. L. R. 1577 (2000); Robert D. Cooter, Expressive
Law and Economics, 27 J. L. S. 585 (1998); Gary S. Becker, Norms and the Formation of Preferences,
in Accounting for Tastes 225 (2 ed 1998); Robert H. Frank, If Homo Economicus Could Choose His
Own Utility Function, Would He Want One With a Conscience?, 77 Am. Econ. Rev. 593 (1987). On
the preference side, it has been argued that people tend to have a preference for fairness and reciprocity
(Gary S. Becker, Norms and the Formation of Preferences, in Accounting for Tastes 225 (2 ed 1998);
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 Chicago L. Rev. 943, 1003 (1995)) or for
other normative values. It is in a similar flavor when scholars argue that norms are followed not for
instrumental reasons but unconditionally for their own value (Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic
Theory, 3 J. Ec. Persp. 99 (1989); Joseph Heath, The Structure of Normative Control, 17 L. & Philos.
419 (1998)), out of altruistic preferences (Lynn A. Stout, Other-Regarding Preferences and Social
Norms, Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No 265902, (Washington, 2001)), out of
emotions (Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Altruistic punishment in humans, 415 Nature 137 (2002)), for
conformity (Douglas B. Bernheim, A Theory of Conformity, 102 J. Pol. Ec. 841 (1994)), or for being
esteemed (Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L.
Rev. 338, 355 et seq. (1997)). On the constraint side, the idea usually is that people incur some kind of
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more radical than that.7 While other approaches, notably E. Posner’s signaling theory,
have also relied on reputation, they have insisted that an individual’s reputation conveys a piece of information on her character, preferences, or other intrinsic property.8
By contrast, the reputation theory of norms advocated here goes without even such
modest assumptions, thus complementing other rational choice accounts: Reputation
is conceived of as a mere social construct. The underlying claim is that there can be a
promising rational choice theory of social norms, and that reputation theory is at least
part of such a comprehensive approach.

The paper contains five sections. The first section introduces the notion of
rational indeterminacy. The concept of norms is defined as a response to rational
indeterminacy. The second section raises the problem of norm stability as the key
challenge to norms. A solution is developed at the general level using the notions of
norm network effects and preference compatibility. In the third section, the solution
concept is applied at a more concrete level to explain the stability of reputation
norms. Based on a better understanding of norm stability, it is shown that reputation
is strong enough to induce even compliance with norms in favor of collective goods.
Also, reputation theory is compared to the norm theories by McAdams and by E.
Posner. Up to this point, the paper is of a very theoretical kind. Therefore, the fourth

internal cost or punishment when violating the norm (Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law and
Economics, 27 J. L. S. 585, 597 et seq. (1998); Richard A. Posner & Eric Rasmusen, Creating and
Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 Intl. L. & Econ. Rev. 369 (1999)).
7

Cf. the critique of E. Posner’s reductionism in Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount

Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 Y. L. J. 625, 681-6 (2001).
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section offers a few examples. The fifth section concludes with a short outlook,
particularly for normative analysis.

As even this short overview reveals, the paper dwells quite a while on issues
that seem to have little to do with reputation. Those arguments, relating to norm stability and communication, are important parts of the theory. Nonetheless, it is warranted to speak of a reputation theory of norms. All those arguments help make the case
that reputation is a richer and more powerful concept than is usually believed.

I. Norms and Rational Indeterminacy

The central problem of a norms theory under methodological individualism and
rational choice is: How can cooperation and collective action evolve in view of
individual utility maximization? I will argue that, paradoxically, the solution to this
problem lies in the fact that rational individuals (or, as I will say: players) have to
cope with an even more fundamental challenge, namely the problem of rational indeterminacy. Basically, rational indeterminacy is the problem that when all actors are
rational it becomes hard to tell how to act rationally.

Economics has taught us a lot about cooperative relationships. Under
cooperation, I understand all kinds of exchanges or trades between very few people –
the kind of trades that conventionally are deemed less problematic than collective
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In E. Posner’s model, this is the individual discount rate, see III.4. infra at 43
.
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action involving many players. The most famous cooperation game is the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (Table 1).

a

b

A

2/2

0/3

B

3/0

1/1

TABLE 1 – PRISONER’S DILEMMA

As is well known, there is a solution to the dilem
ma: A cooperative outcome
can be attained if the game is played not just once, but is repeated infinitely.9 With
the prospect of infinite repetition, players can agree on Tit for Tat or a similar
strategy. They can induce each other to play the cooperative move by promising to
play cooperatively in future rounds, which promise in turn is kept because of future
rounds, and so on ad infinitum.

9

An additional condition is that the discount factor must be sufficiently close to 1, i.e. the

players must value the future sufficiently high. For a full statement of the “Folk Theorem” see Drew
Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Game Theory 150 et seq. (1996). Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, Games
and Decisions : Introduction and Critical Survey 94 et seq. (1957) provide an illustrative discussion of
the finitely repeated version and its quandaries.
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This mechanism seems so obvious that not many questions have been asked.
But strategies like Tit for Tat are more problematic than is commonly believed.
Consider the standard setting of the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. As we have seen
(and is intuitively clear), a cooperative outcome turns on a threat not to cooperate in
future rounds if the partner flunks in the present round. Threatening implies
conditional play, that is, players must condition their decisions on what has happened
in the past. Natural as this requirement is, it is a problem for rational players. Rational
players cannot commit to one long-term strategy, once and forever. Instead, they are
free in every round to disregard their long-term strategy.10 In particular, whether rowplayer (in Table 1) should play her cooperative move in round 1 hinges on whether
column- player is going to play conditionally in round 2. What should row-player
believe? Suppose she believes that column-player will play conditionally. Is there any
incentive for column-player to play in accordance with this belief? Without further
assumptions, there is no such incentive: For in round 2, column-player can no longer
influence the outcome in round 1. All that matters to her is round 2 and the following
rounds. In principle, it would be perfectly rational for column-player to be cheated in
every round and, nevertheless, play on cooperatively because row-player promises to

10

This problem has seldom been analyzed explicitly in this context. It is noticed, inter alia, in

David M. Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Modelling 71 (1990) and Jordan Howard Sobel, Utility
Maximizers in Iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas, in Campbell & Sowden, ed, Paradoxes of Rationality and
Cooperation 306, 311 et seq. (1985). Binmore argues that if a player observes her opponent deviating
in spite of her credible threat she might lose trust in her opponent’s rationality and thus refrain from
cooperating. See Ken Binmore, 2 Game Theory and the Social Contract : Just Playing 356 (1998).
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play cooperatively from now on.11 The Prisoner’s Dilemma has turned into a
Punisher’s Dilemma.12

The Punisher’s Dilemma arises even though the players are assumed to be
utility maximizers. I should rather say: It arises because the players are utility
maximizers (and nothing more).13 To some rational indeterminacy may appear too
counterintuitive – an intriguing puzzle perhaps, but not one that helps explain social
reality. Particularly, it seems as if rational indeterminacy rested on a very strong,
unrealistic concept of rationality. However, consider a milder interpretation: Assume
that individuals follow a behavioral program but that this program is of such an
enormous complexity that it is by no means possible to predict it. If the behavioral
program is to maximize the individual’s utility, then rational indeterminacy will again
pop up in designing the program. Somewhat simpler put, even if you do not buy
rational indeterminacy as a problem of whether conditional play can exist at all, it is a
much more difficult to escape the problem of predicting the concrete conditions that

11

Intuitively, when cooperation has collapsed for some time players will make attempts to re-

start cooperation. The game theoretic literature on “renegotiation proofness” predicts that they will
return to cooperation after a cheater has been punished to an extent that would have deterred her ex
ante (cf. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Game Theory 179-82 (1996); Roger B. Myerson, Game
Theory : Analysis of Conflict 408-12 (3 ed 1997)). The very point of this literature is that cheating
must not be a profitable strategy in the first place. This, however, is exactly what the above argument
casts doubt on: The very question is if rational maximizers of utility can attain cooperation at all.
12

Usually, the term is reserved for collective good problems, that is for the problem of how

players can be motivated to incur the cost of punishment when others fail to contribute to the collective
good. Therefore, Buchanan distinguishes the above problem by calling it the “time dimension” of the
punishment dilemma, see James Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty 134 (1975).
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lend themselves to conditional play. Suppose player A has cheated on player B.
Which inferences can be drawn? Sometimes, authors postulate that what happened in
the past is likely to happen again in the future.14 One pretty natural inference then is
that A will cheat again on B in the same type of transaction. But what is the same type
of transaction? Do we expect murder from a shoplifter? Further: Does C has to
conclude from A’s conduct towards B that A is going to cheat on her as well? What if
C has different business with A or belongs to a different group?

The answer to these questions is likely to vary greatly over situations, groups,
and cultures. Under the theory presented here, it is social norms that fill the vast space
opened up by rational indeterminacy, thus causing such variations. This, of course, is
only the description of norms’ function. What interests us more is how this function is
fulfilled by norms and, accordingly, what norms actually consist of. The answer I
offer to this question is simple. In my view, the empty space of indeterminacy is
conquered by the softest of all forces, information. More specifically, it is information
generated mostly by means of communication.

13

The argument in the text is closely related to the concept of double contingency as set out in

Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems 103 et seq. (1995).
14

This claim seems somewhat naive for epistemological reasons that are of quite practical rele-

vance. Roughly, the question is: What exactly does it mean to act “in the same way?” See Robert
Sugden, The Role of Inductive Reasoning in the Evolution of Conventions, 17 L. & Philos. 377, 386-7
(1998) and Leif Johansen, Interaction in Economic Theory, 3 Economie Apliquée 229, 245 (1981).
The problem is also noticed by E. Posner and compared to legal decision-making. See Eric A. Posner,
Efficient Norms, in Newman, ed, 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 19
(1998).
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This is quite an astonishing idea. Norms drive people to volunteer for social
work, to refuse bribes, and to participate in blood vendettas. It is hard to conceive
how mere communication (“cheap talk”) can impact on a fact as solid as players’
incentive structure.15 But for a theory that aims at explaining norms without resorting
to behavioral constraints (like guilt) or normative preferences (like values) there is
not much of an alternative. Thus, I define norms as

(i)

an equilibrium strategy combination

(ii)

that is common knowledge and

15

Cf. David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in Alt & Shepsle, ed,

Perspectives on Positive Political Economy 90, 111 (1990): Reputation is a “decidedly fragile”
construction; it works only if it works. – Digging somewhat deeper, the question is if rational players
can at all use “any additional information, not incorporated into the utilities of the situation”, see David
Gauthier, Coordination, 14 Dialogue 193, 210 (1975).

While the question is somehow catchy,

Gauthier’s answer in the negative is unconvincing. It amounts to saying that because there is rational
indeterminacy additional information does not matter. Yet this inference would require a further
assumption. Specifically, one would have to assume that rationality does not only itself fail to instruct
players how to choose but also precludes any other prescriptions. While it is true that, trivially, under
rational indeterminacy no rational reasons can be given for making or following a particular strategy
prescription, it does not follow that rational players were bound to disregard any (arbitrary, from
rationality’s point of view) strategy prescription. On the contrary, it is most reasonable for players to
take such a strategy prescription into account if it is common knowledge in their community. In this
case, the prescription is a mental state of at least two individuals and, from the perspective of each
individual, a state of the outside world or a fact. It is not implausible to assume that facts, however
fragile they may be, can alter the calculus of rational maximizers of utility. The problem is also
discussed by Robert Sugden, Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and
Philosophy, 101 Econ. J. 751, 774-8 (1991) and Leif Johansen, Interaction in Economic Theory, 3
Economie Apliquée 229, 244 (1981).
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(iii) is commonly expected.16
The definition starts out from the game theory’s equilibrium concept. A norm
must prescribe an equilibrium. If it did not then – by definition – at least one player
would deviate. As the other players would anticipate the deviation they would
likewise adapt their strategies. The norm would cease to influence behavior.17 Also, it
has become conventional wisdom that for an equilibrium strategy combination to
qualify as a norm it must be common knowledge, i.e. all players must know the
strategy combination, know that all others know it, know that all others know that
they know etc. ad infinitum.18 Hence, when a player undertakes to introduce a new

16

The definition bears some resemblance to the one in Cristina Bicchieri, Rationality and

Cooperation 232 (1993).
17

One qualification is necessary. A norm can also function as a starting point for tracing down

strategy choices to the choices actually expected. Take, for instance, the norm not to lie, i.e. never to
lie. There are plenty of situations where expecting honesty would be rather naive. Still, this does not
imply that the norm not to lie is void. Whenever a player incurs a risk of being caught lying and
whenever there are sufficiently severe sanctions at hand, other players can with some confidence trust
in her being honest. Hence, “never to lie” is a shortcut of the expectations that (i) lies will be
sanctioned if possible and (ii) players will be honest where these sanctions suffice. Based on this
equilibrium people develop a sense (often implicitly) of when credulity would be misplaced.
18

Note that common knowledge is not already required by the equilibrium requirement. – The

standard reference is David Lewis, Conventions: A Philosophical Study 52 et seq. (1969). A strategy
description that is not common knowledge can nonetheless be relevant in a situation. For instance, A
may wish to visit B in B’s office. She knows that B usually is in his office at a certain time, so she does
not announce her visit. Here, A’s going to the office at the chosen time is a strategy description that is
not common knowledge. However, A runs a risk that B is on vacation or has an outside appointment.
Slightly different, if B has been informed of A’s plan, say, by A’s spouse without A’s knowledge, she
might cancel her appointment. Still, the intended meeting is not common knowledge. If A learns of B’s
appointment (but not of the fact that she has cancelled it), A may change her plan. In sum, strategy
descriptions that fail to be common knowledge are prone to errors and discoveries. It is for this reason
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norm, she needs to create common knowledge of the proposed course of action. She
can do so through cheap talk. Alternatively, she can simply play according to the
norm that is to be introduced. When a certain move only makes sense under a
particular norm then playing the move implies proposing the respective norm. In
either case, the proponent of a new course of action has to be anxious about making
her proposal common knowledge. Establishing a norm requires making it common
knowledge or “communicating” it.19

However, common knowledge does not suffice to turn a strategy description
into a norm. There can easily be several strategy descriptions that are common
knowledge but are, at the same time, inconsistent with each other. A straightforward
example is explicit communication of alternative proposals as in a debate or when a
question is asked: Should we do x or y? In such a case, neither x nor y should be
considered a norm. Generally, the definition of norms should not allow, as a regular
matter, for the existence of multiple inconsistent norms. For given players in a given
situation, it is conceivable that there are more than one potential norms but it would

that Lewis excluded these “odd cases” from his definition of a convention, see David Lewis,
Conventions: A Philosophical Study 59 (1969).
19

Cf. Marco Colombetti, A Modal Logic of Intentional Communication, 38 Math. Soc.

Sciences 171 (1999) for the literal meaning of “communication” as “making something common”. –
The notion that communication changes matter has been examined by a string of game theoretic
literature. The most interesting part of that literature for the present context deals with announcements
of future play (rather than an exchange of factual information). See Joseph Farrell, Communication,
Coordination and Nash Equilibrium, 27 Econ. Letters 209 (1988) with the strong assumption that
players will believe each other unless there is reason for being suspicious. See also Matthew Rabin, A
Model of Pre-game Communication, 63 J. Econ. Th. 370 (1994).
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be odd to think, again as a regular matter, of more than one actual norm. Therefore,
an equilibrium strategy combination that is common knowledge is a norm only if,
additionally, the relevant players expect it to be actually played.20 Only equilibrium
strategies that are common knowledge and at the same time commonly expected
qualify as social norms.21

The latter stipulation, indispensable as it is in order to limit the scope of the
concept, arouses a suspicion of circularity. That a course of action is commonly
expected seems a deus ex machina to explain any curiosity in the world of norms (not
unlike the “explanation” that players just have a taste for complying with norms).22
To offer a meaningful account, there must be a specific model of when players will in
fact expect a particular strategy to be played. The analysis of norm stability in the
next section is such a model. It fleshes out the success chances for strategy
combinations, both proposed and incumbent ones. Players are skilled, by virtue of
their social knowledge, in assessing those chances. Even if they fail initially to
anticipate the successful proposals they can adjust their expectations later. The idea
thus is that players have a sense of which expectations can become stable, and will
adopt only such promising proposals.

20

At least, the players must deem it it possible that the strategy combination will be actually

played.
21

Note that, in analogy to common knowledge, the expectation must also be “common”: A

norm must be expected to be played, expected to be expected and so on ad infinitum.
22

See Paul G. Mahoney, Norms and Signals: Some Skeptical Observations, 36 U. Rich. L. Rev.

387 (2002) and Robert D. Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? : An Economic Analysis of
Internalized Norms, 86 Va. L. R. 1577, 1591 (2000).

- 12 -

II. Stable Norms

Norms are equilibrium strategies that have been made common knowledge. We
have seen though that this is not sufficient. As a third condition, I have stipulated that
the strategy combination must be commonly expected. I further specified this
condition by referring to the (potential) stability of the strategy combination. Now,
while there has been intensive research on the equilibrium concept, I am not aware of
much analytical work on the persistence of an established equilibrium (i.e., a norm).23
This is quite astonishing. If norms consist of nothing more than information they
must be extremely susceptible to additional information that creates ambiguity and
thus tends to restore indeterminacy. I submit it is at this point that the most can be
learned about the nature of social norms: Norms must be shaped in a way that assures
their survival in spite of abundant incentives to oppose them. I refer to this condition
as the stability condition. If the stability condition does not obtain, the norm cannot
solve even the slightest conflict: As soon as the norm would decide for one party, the
other party could produce a different norm – simply by communicating it.24

23

Note that my terminology restricts the equilibrium concept. The stability condition could also

be included in the concept of equilibrium if the game was modeled more comprehensively. A similar
ambiguity – between cheap talk and its costly consequences – is noted in Joseph Farrell, Talk Is
Cheap, 85 Am. Econ. Rev. 186, 189-90 (1995).
24

To be sure, there are norms that do not face opposition, or only very mild opposition as the

norm on which side of the road to drive (left-handed players might have a slight preference for driving
onthe left hand side). Yet the more interesting cases are certainly those where incentives exist to
overthrow the norm. – The problem is akin to Lessig’s distinction between contestable and
uncontestable kinds of social meaning: A stable norm ascribes a certain meaning to an act, and that the
individual actor cannot tamper with that meaning. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27
J. L. S. 661, 682-3 (1998); similarly Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Col. L. Rev.
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Hence, for a norm to persist it does not suffice that it is common knowledge and
prescribes an equilibrium. Additionally, the norm must be such that interested
players, given existing communication technology and other norms, are not able to
establish a different norm in its place. The following subsections introduce two
mechanisms that bring about such stability.

1. STABILITY AND NETWORK EFFECTS

The first mechanism protecting the norm consists of a large number of players
who would have to opt out of the existing norm and switch to the new norm. To this
variable, I refer to as the network effects of a norm.25

An study of a historical reputation norm among by Avner Greif demonstrates
why network effects are decisive. The “Maghribi traders” were a distinct community
of Jewish merchants that survived as a group throughout generations and centuries,

903, 926-9 (1996). The present theory undertakes to specify what makes a meaning contestable, thus
meeting Lessig’s demand.
25

The idea of norm network effects is explicated by Michael Adams, Norms, Standards, Rights,

12 Eur. J. Pol. Econ. 363 (1996). See also Richard A. Posner & Eric Rasmusen, Creating and
Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 Intl. L. & Econ. Rev. 369, 377-80 (1999).
See generally on the economics of network effects: William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, Network
Externalities, in Bouckaert & De Geest, ed, 1 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 952 (2000);
Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 Intern. J. Ind. Organ. 673 (1996); Paul A.
David & Shane Greenstein, The Economics of Compatibility Standards: An Introduction to Recent
Research, 1 Econ. Innov. New Techn. 3 (1990). Put somewhat differently, norm stability owes a lot to
the collective action problem of switching to a new norm. See Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law and
Economics, 27 J. L. S. 585, 588-97 (1998) and Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96
Col. L. Rev. 903, 911 (1996).
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and in spite of migration. They had developed an especially efficient enforcement
mechanism for merchant agents: An agent who cheated became subject to a boycott
by all other members of the community. Therefore, a principal who had wished to
hire such an agent would have had to provide a higher stream of remuneration to him
in order to guarantee his faithfulness. Thus, ironically, a cheater would earn a higher
wage, that is, a higher remuneration per transaction. But because of that higher wage,
principals would strictly prefer to hire other, less expensive agents, so that in total the
cheater’s income would be much lower than that of an honest member of the
community. Thus, the reputation norm was self-fulfilling – it was effective because it
was effective. Apparently, the prospect of that loss was sufficient to deter most agents
from cheating and, as Greif reports, to induce (alleged) cheaters to compensate their
principals.

The mechanism used by the Maghribi traders is paradigmatic for the way a
(reputation) norm ensures its stability. In Greif’s own words:

It is the uncoordinated response of all the merchants and the interrelations between
their expected future behavior and an agent’s optimal wage as perceived by an optimal
merchant that insures solidarity of incentives. […] Hence, merchants follow the
multilateral punishment despite the fact that the agent’s strategy does not call for cheating any merchant who violated the collective punishment, and despite the fact that cheating in the past does not indicate that the agent is a ‘lemon.’26

26

Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi

Traders' Coalition, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 525, 534-5 (1993), italics in the original.
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A cheating agent in the Maghribi community had little chance to dethrone the
reputation norm. The reason is that the norm commanded strong network effects:
Because all Maghribis relied on the norm, every trader benefited greatly from a
spotless reputation and this, in turn, accounted for the price differential between
honest agents and cheaters. For a reputation norm like the Maghribis’, network
effects result from the value of cooperative opportunities that hinge on a good
reputation.27 Just like the network effects inherent to other network goods, the value
of reputation increases with the number of players who apply the reputation norm.

The link to stability stems from the cost of uncertainty: Whatever new norm is
proposed it is most unlikely that all players will switch, and will switch simultaneously. As a consequence, switching norms entails the risk that there will be two different
norms, at least for some time. With two different norms, network effects are weaker:
If, by cheating, a player risks her reputation only with part of the population, the
reputation mechanism has less leverage. Also, players adhering to the smaller norm
network are worst affected, as their norm has the least deterrent effect. Therefore,
players are eager to stay with the major norm network.

The only way to push for norm change is to compete against the major norm in
terms of focality. But communication cost rises with necessary network size. If a
Maghribi trader had intended to violate the norm he would have had to convince at
least a great part of community members – who were dispersed all over the

27

Those benefits stem from participation in a market, as opposed to a small number of
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Mediterranean. Hence, strong network effects increase the norm’s stability by
imposing high communication cost on competing proposals. To amend a norm with
strong network effects one has to communicate with a great number of players. What
is more, not only must one spread the new norm itself but also must players be
convinced that sufficiently many other players are actually going to switch norms.28

The magnitude of network effects does not only have implications for a norm’s
stability but also for the ease with which it is introduced. If a proposed norm would
have strong network effects, players are sensitive to whether or not it will become effective. Accordingly, players tend to provide incentives for others to inform them, i.e.
to speak out about their own opinion as well as the opinion distribution over the population. However, this interest only exists if the proposal is a serious candidate for
becoming the norm. If it is not, players are especially uninterested even if, in
substance, they would strongly prefer the norm to be introduced. These self-amplifying (or self-weakening) social dynamics of network effects account for tippingeffects like in the rise and fall of “political correctness”.29

invariable long-term relationships.
28

This raises an additional question: What convinces players that other players will switch? The

situation is pretty clear if they give their explicit assent. If they do not communicate (or if their
statement is unknown) there is an ambiguity. As I will argue in the next subsection, in case of an
ambiguity players should be expected to play according to the norm proposal they prefer (infra at 20).
Hence, whether one can count on players to switch norms will, in ambiguous cases, turn on one’s
beliefs about their preferences.
29

See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Col. L. Rev. 903, 912 (1996). For a

brief overview of tipping effects in the literature on network effects see only William H. Page & John
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2. STABILITY AND PREFERENCE COMPATIBILITY

Network effects make norms stable by virtue of the cost of communication and
uncertainty. A stable norm with strong network effects owes its edge to a large number of players who would have to coordinate on a new norm. Yet we have also seen
that norm change is not precluded by strong network effects. On the contrary,
network effects can promote a new norm if players expect it to succeed. Thus, we
need additional criteria for determining which norm proposals are likely to succeed or
fail. For instance, there is a strong intuition that purely self-serving aspirations to
norm change must fail. A cheater in the Maghribi community most probably cannot
succeed with a proposal to exempt only him from losing his reputation even if
communication were costless. This example is quite self-evident but a theory of
norms should offer an explanation for this intuition.

To that purpose, I extend the analysis to include the players’ interest in the
substance of a norm. I refer to this interest as individual preferences, as opposed to
the benefits from adhering to a norm with strong network effects (network
preferences). Individual preferences result from individual switching costs, which can
create a preponderance for the status quo (e.g., learning cost).30 More interestingly,

E. Lopatka, Network Externalities, in Bouckaert & De Geest, ed, 1 Encyclopedia of Law and
Economics 952, 960-3 (2000).
30

See Michael Adams, Norms, Standards, Rights, 12 Eur. J. Pol. Econ. 363, 370-2 (1996) and

Richard A. Posner & Eric Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to
Sanctions, 19 Intl. L. & Econ. Rev. 369, 377-9 (1999). – Another source of switching costs is the fact
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individual preferences differ with respect to the content of different norms. To cite
my evident example from above, the cheater under the Maghribi norm surely has a
strong preference for being pardoned, while all traders have an interest in sustaining
the norm’s deterrent effect.

If individual preferences are to shape norms we need an idea of how this
happens. There are at least three ways in which individual preferences influence the
comparative stability of norms.

The first source of influence is that individual players can raise or decrease
communication costs for a norm proposal. We have seen that, if a norm has strong
network effects, a new proposal must be communicated to as great a number of
players as possible. Beside public communication (meetings, mass media etc.), a very
important communication channel is conversations between individual players.
Because outsiders have difficulties controlling personal communication it gives latitude in what to tell or suppress. Therefore, players can use personal communication to
spread only norm proposals that they have individual preferences for.

The second source of influence is related to the first one: Not only do preferred
norm proposals spread more easily in personal communication; they also earn
(explicit or implicit) approval. When players learn in a number of independent
conversations that other players support a proposal they can build confidence that a

that a norm change may destroy the reputation of players that stemmed from compliance with the
norm.
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norm switch is actually going to happen. A social consensus emerges. Conversely, if
a norm is disliked players will utter disapproval and announce not to comply with the
norm.31 Because of network effects, a norm proposal that remains controversial is less
likely to be relied on for actual behavior.

The third source of influence arises in ambiguous cases: Often, it will not be
clear which of several norm proposals is going to succeed. A similar problem occurs
when a norm, while not challenged, is ambiguous with regard to a particular situation.32 Players cannot, in these cases, rely on network effects and settled expectations
to make their decision. But in the absence of better criteria they can at least reveal
their individual preferences. The way to do that is, simply, to comply with one’s
preferred norm proposal.

Thus, there are at least three mechanisms – communicating the proposal, expression of consent/dissent, and choice in ambiguous cases – that give more preferred
norms a competitive edge over less preferred norms. The process of norm selection is

31

Players can often afford to be honest because they are not bound by their statement. If it turns

out that the proposal becomes the norm, they can still adapt to the majority opinion. The only risk they
run is a (limited) embarrassment.
32

E. Posner describes a similar notion by emphasizing the “irreducibly specific” character of

“applying” norms to a particular situation, see Eric A. Posner, Efficient Norms, in Newman, ed, 2 The
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 19, 20 (1998). The problem is most familiar to
every lawyer. See also n. 14 supra. In a way, the problems of applying existing norms and introducing
new norms are in fact identical: That a norm is ambiguous with regard to a particular situation is little
different from saying that there is a lack of a norm deciding the case.
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biased towards individually preferred norms. Hence, I will say that, in order to be
stable, a norm must be preference compatible.33

I have argued that stable norms must be preference compatible and must have
strong network effects. These two conditions interrelate. Stable norms must at the
same time be shared and preferred by most members of the relevant group. To match
both conditions, norms must be an acceptable compromise for most group members.
This has an effect on norm design. While trader A originally does not care if trader B
(C, D, …) is cheated, he is vitally interested that no one cheats on him. Accordingly,
B does not care for A, C, D, and all other players provided he is not cheated himself.
A reputation norm must overcome this indifference. The solution is to bundle the
prohibitions to cheat on players A, B, (C, …) to one general ban on cheating. Only
the general ban is preferred by all traders, can create a large norm network, and thus
exploit strong network effects. Now, if a cheater proposed an exception for himself,
the ban on cheating would no longer be a general one. Even a single exception would
pose a problem. Players will suspect that more exceptions will follow the first, and
they may well be right. There is, in other words, a (tacit) norm that no exceptions will

33

Of course, there is also a variety of reasons why people do not express their preferences in the

ways specified in the text. The standard reference is Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies (1995)
but see also Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 186 et seq. (2000). It is not quite clear though what
this implies for preference compatibility. If speech is restrained by norms, preference compatibility
simply returns on a higher level: A norm restraining free speech may very well itself be preference
compatible – for the very results it has on “lower order” norms. For the potentially desirable effects of
restricting free speech see Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, Words that Kill: An
Economic Perspective on Hate Speech and Hate Crimes, Illinois Law & Econ. Research Paper No 0034, (Urbana-Champaign, 2001)). Of course, this sketchy analysis by far does not exhaust the problem.
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be made.34 Once loopholes were accepted, the rule would lose its simplicity. Without
simplicity, players cannot monitor if others still adhere to the network. If mistrust in
the norm’s validity grows, the network ultimately collapses. Because players know
this consequence, they strongly oppose such norm change.35

III. Explaining Norms

Most rational choice theorists feel confident to explain cooperation among few
players. What troubles them are norms that go beyond cooperation, namely norms
that are costly to players without providing an immediate gain to them.36 One such
puzzle to rational choice theory is that people incur the cost of voting although the
chance to make a difference in the election result is vanishing. Another is the fact that
people pay more taxes than we would predict considering the expected value of legal
sanctions.

34

Of course, real world norms usually have more sophisticated mechanisms to maintain norm

confidence. The picture is rough but it lays bare the basic driving force.
35

This, I think, is the appropriate solution to avoid the fatalism of David M. Kreps, Game

Theory and Economic Modelling 71 (1990): Kreps raises the concern that players could find it in their
best joint interest to “forgive and forget” in order to preserve opportunities for cooperation with the
cheater. Kreps’ point is so interesting because it invokes rational indeterminacy and the Punisher’s
Dilemma (cf. supra at 7). The solution is this: With a norm in place, the basic setup of rational
indeterminacy has changed. Now, a norm violator has to accomplish an amendment to the norm, which
not only takes time and effort but also is likely to fail because other players fear to be left without any
norm or with a norm that is less effective. In many cases, these factors will eliminate rational
indeterminacy.
36

Recall that I have loosely defined cooperation as exchanges or trades between very few

people, supra at 4.
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Nonetheless, I start out with a short analysis of cooperation norms (1. below). I
do this in spite of theorists’ confidence because cooperation too is plagued by rational
indeterminacy and thus faces the problem of norm stability. Once it is understood
how precarious cooperative reputation is, and why it nevertheless exists, it turns out
that other norms can build on the same mechanism (2.). The overall model so
developed is then compared to two other norm theories based on rational choice,
namely Richard McAdams’ esteem model (3.) and Eric Posner’s signaling model (4.).

1. COOPERATION NORMS

I have noted in the first section that even cooperation between pairs of players
is much more troublesome than is usually perceived.37 Reputation norms enforcing
cooperative behavior are even more puzzling: How can a player be induced to
sanction a wrong done to another?38

Conventional analysis of reputation very often relies on private information.39
This way of looking at reputation is characterized by assuming a piece of modelexogenous information, i.e., information that is not itself explained as a result of the
theory. A typical example is that some players command a better production

37
38

Cf. supra at 6.
Thus, I leave aside the problem of simple 2-players iterated Prisoners’ Dilemmas. One

solution to this problem is that conditional play in the 2-players iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma rests on
the threat of earning a reputation as a wimp.
39

So do the seminal papers David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect

Information, 27 J. Econ. Th. 253 (1982) and David M. Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation in the
Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, 27 J. Econ. Th. 245 (1982).
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technology making cooperation less costly. If there is a market, these players can
offer better prices under which other, less well-equipped players cannot supply the
same quality. The reputation mechanism then works to sort out the less well-equipped
players by the low quality they deliver at the low market price. Here, reputation is a
revelation of private information (production technology) through observable
behavior (quality delivered in the past). Note that the differences in production
technology are assumed, not explained. Therefore, it is fair to say that these models
are based on model-exogenous information. What those models do explain is how
reputation emerges from such a given difference.

Reputation norms based on model-exogenous information are inevitably stable:
It is always credible to promote such a norm because the good sellers as well as the
buyers only benefit from adhering to it. Conversely, opposing the norm is selfdefeating because it only shows that one does not benefit, which means that one is a
bad seller. Therefore, a theory of reputation based on model-exogenous information
does not need the complicated theories of norm stability laid out in the previous section. In particular, reputation based on model-exogenous information does not rely on
network effects: If a player can fully observe the history of the game she need not
bother if others apply the same reputation norm. The reason is that here the norm is
nothing more than a Bayesian inference to estimate the probability of a seller having
the good technology.40

40

Note already that reputation based on model-exogenous information closely resembles signa-

ling theory. Cf. III.4. at 43 infra for E. Posner’s signaling model. At closer inspection, there is no
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However, that is not yet the full story. There is a second type of reputation that,
in a way, creates information. Greif’s analysis of the Maghribi Traders’ reputation
norm is an example of such a model that endogenously explains the relevant
information, rather than assuming it. This difference clearly emerges in the language
of the above quote: According to Greif, cheaters would be punished “despite the fact
that cheating in the past does not indicate that the agent is a ‘lemon.’”41 The
reputation theory proposed in this paper is concerned with this second type of
reputation, not with the first one based on model-exogenous information. Therefore,
to simplify terminology when I speak of “reputation” I refer only to this second type
(unless otherwise indicated).

We have seen that reputation norms of the first type (i.e., reputation based on
model- exogenous information) will always be robust as it is always unambiguously
best for players to stick to the norm. The puzzle mentioned above of why players
would punish a wrong done to another player pertains only to second-type reputation
norms. It is at this point that the concept of norm stability developed in the previous
section comes into play. The key to stability of (second-type) reputation norms is
their strong network effects. Recall that, in the case of a stigmatized Maghribi traderagent, principals had to pay a higher remuneration in a long-term cooperative

difference at all: Delivering good quality to other players is a signal that one is a good seller, just like
boasting expensive premises may be a signal that one is expecting to stay in business for long (and
thus will honor one’s obligations).
41

Cf. supra at 14 and Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early

Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 525, 534-5 (1993), (italics in the original).

- 25 -

relationship to ensure faithful performance. It followed that cheaters were more
expensive agents so that principals were driven to shun them by turning to cheaper
supply of the service. Thus, in contrast to reputation based on model-exogenous
information, the competitive edge of faithful agents here is generated endogenously
by the norm itself. A Maghribi trader is well advised to mistrust a cheating member
and turn to a less suspicious fellow as long as he is confident that the norm will
remain effective. But an attempt to change the norm also fails to be preference compatible. The incentive to push for changing the reputation norm is in most cases
purely opportunistic.42 That is, only an agent who has cheated has an incentive to get
rid of the norm while honest agents and principals have a preference for retaining it.
It follows that the incentive to amend the norm is confined to the individual cheater
(plus possibly a number of players who maintain long-term cooperative relationships
with him). The vast majority of players is interested in sustaining the norm and
therefore opposed to undermining its credibility. Therefore, amending the norm fails
to be compatible with the preferences of the vast majority.

43

2. BEYOND COOPERATION: INTERNAL LOSS NORMS

We have seen why cooperative reputation norms can be quite robust. Cooperative reputation induces players to forego the potential gains from cheating, thus
benefiting cooperation partners. Yet there are other norms that are just as costly to

42

It may not be opportunistic if there is a probability that players are falsely accused of

cheating.
43

Cf. supra at 21.

- 26 -

comply with while not delivering (immediate) benefits to cooperation partners. These
norms are of particular interest because they seem to be most at odds with rational
choice. Therefore, the analysis of such norms in this subsection goes at some length
to introduce the concept of internal loss norms (a)), address the key question of how
these norms accomplish stability (b)), and relate them to the problem of collective
goods (c)).
a) Internal Loss Norms

To get a better sense of the problem, consider the example of an
environmentalist: Say I insist that my friends pay regard to preserving nature and the
environment. If I am an attractive friend to have, then perhaps some people may be
induced to rituals such as separating garbage. Yet the problem is that, by pressuring
my friends, I cannot noticeably improve the environment. At the same time,
separating garbage and similar activities are not too much fun, and they cost leisure.
Chances are that my friends would be fond of me even more if I allowed them to
maintain our relationship without caring for the environment. Hence, both my friends
and I would be better off if I gave up my obsession with the environment. So why do
we not spare us the hassle and stop feeling responsible for things that we cannot
change anyway?

More specifically, my demand to protect the environment faces a paretosuperior equilibrium viewed from my standpoint and that of my friends: The
environmentalist norm leads us to give up value from our cooperative relationship.
Since norms like the environmentalist one create a loss from the point of view of
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cooperation partners, I refer to them as internal loss norms (ILN). By contrast, the
cooperation norms considered in the previous subsection reduced cheating between
the cooperation partners; they generated an internal gain.

In principle, the cost imposed by ILN may just be lost. Alternatively, the costly
activity required by the ILN can have a positive or negative effect on the group and
on outsiders. It can consist of promoting a collective good, as in the example of the
environmentalist norm. It follows that ILN can contribute to solving collective good
problems (which I will discuss below c)). Note, however, that the definition of ILN
only requires that players incur an internal loss.
b) Internal Loss Norms and Stability

The definition of ILN already points at the very problem they pose: How can a
norm be stable if the players immediately involved could, in principle, do much
better? Why would they not maximize their joint benefit by agreeing to abolish the
ILN?

The trouble with ILN is that the players directly involved have every incentive
to abolish the norm. Hence, ILN face a particularly adverse problem of norm
stability. Under the norm stability theory developed in the previous section it is clear
that they need to call in powerful network effects, and that they must be preference
compatible. An ILN can quite easily be preference compatible, particularly if it helps
supply a collective good. The more serious problem is to arrange strong network
effects. ILN themselves lack network effects: While they may provide collective
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goods and, to the extent they do so, increase every individual player’s welfare, one
does not have to comply with the ILN oneself in order to participate in the collective
good. On the contrary, not complying with an ILN is, by the definition of ILN, the
dominant strategy choice. ILN seem to thwart the only mechanism that could give
them stability.

If ILN cannot win on their own they must look for a powerful ally. Such a potential ally exists – it is the cooperative reputation norms analyzed in the previous
subsection. Cooperative reputation norms boast strong network effects because selfinterest induces players to avoid reputational outcasts.44 The solution for ILN,
therefore, is to link themselves to a cooperative reputation norm, which by its very
nature has a large network with strong network effects.45 At first look, the idea of
linking norms may seem dubious. Also, it seems odd that a cooperative norm can be
harnessed to impose behavior that “wastes” cooperative gain. But linking particular
norms is itself a norm. Its stability follows the general conditions specified for norm
stability, namely network effects and preference compatibility. Linking an ILN to a
cooperative reputation norm simply redefines reputation and can as such be founded
on network effects and preference compatibility. As we have seen, standard cooperative reputation is actually no different: From the point of view of one particular cooperative relationship, the partner’s reliability in another relationships is equally a

44

See supra 1. at 23.

45

It is in the nature of the theory advocated here that this link does not flow from model-

exogenous information (cf. supra 1. at 23
); for a model of ILN based on exog enous information see
Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J. L. & Econ. 519 (1996).
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“waste”. Nonetheless, reputation links performing under one’s obligations in one
relationship to another cooperative relationship. If reputation can do a job as
precarious as this, then it can also enforce ILN.

To illustrate, consider once again the Maghribi community. Presumably, being
a reputable member of this community required professing the Jewish creed. On the
other hand, retaining the Jewish religion was probably a costly behavior at times; it
was, in other words, an ILN. Of course, membership awarded certain benefits, such
as participation in the cooperative reputation norm, which compensated for the cost.
Nonetheless, the key problem of ILN arose for the Maghribi community as well,
namely why players should not take the benefits of cooperation while breaking with
the ILN. The solution of the community, most probably, was to link a trader’s
reputation to, amongst other things, not abandoning his religion. If one of the traders
had wished to give up his religion he would have lost his reputation and thus the
benefits of being hired as an agent. To avoid this loss he would have had to convince
the whole community of amending the norm, which would have been extremely
costly (if at all possible).

It can be retained as a result that ILN gain stability when they link themselves
to cooperative reputation norms. Yet so far the argument has only been that such
linking is possible at all. It is a different question how powerful this explanation is.
Basically, the ability of cooperative reputation to sustain ILN depends on the value of
cooperative reputation for the individual player. The question is if reputation is strong
enough a basis to explain the variety and total cost of the ILN in the real world, or at
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least a significant part of them. The claim of a reputation theory of norms, naturally,
is that reputation generates a lot of value for players and can extract considerable
value for sustaining ILN. There are (at least) three points to be made for that claim.

The first point is a defense against a potential objection. For one might argue
that we observe most individuals to trade with a relatively small and constant set of
partners. This seems to suggest that long-term cooperative relationships predominate
and that reputation is not too important after all. The underlying assumption is that
reputation and long-term relationships are substitutes. This assumption, however, is
only partly correct. It fails to realize that long-term cooperative relationships and
reputation are also complements. At its heart, cooperative reputation consists of increasing the cost of cheating: The cheater loses not only one relation but any possible
relation. Of course, if players did not have an interest in preserving outside options,
reputation would not have much weight. However, I claim they do have such an
interest even in spite of considerable investment in present relations and in spite of
little actual switching.46 This interest consists of the benefits of (potential)
competition: The option to switch partners is both a check against opportunism and
an incentive for partners to enhance their attractiveness. Hence, without the option to
leave, even a long-term relationship loses a great deal of its value. Consider marriage,
a relationship that is meant to last a lifetime. It seems obvious to me that a spouse

46

Note that without such an interest, reputation and the benefits of enhanced enforcement

would not exist.
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loses a lot of leverage within marriage when she gives up all her outside options
(ranging from career opportunities to personal attractiveness as friend or companion).

The second reason to think that cooperative reputation is powerful pertains to
specific types of cooperation. Often the very value of a relationship is gaining access
to a relationship network or group. Whenever exchanging social links is part of the
deal – and it probably is quite often – one’s reputation directly affects the quality of
the good that one offers. For instance, in marriage the social relations and status of a
spouse is a crucial asset for exchange. Similarly, if a company hires a politician
retiree it does so in order to gain access to the public (other politicians, government
officials, journalists etc.). If the politician is prosecuted for tax evasion she may lose
her reputation with the group that she was supposed to provide access to.

There is a third point bolstering the claim that reputation is strong enough to
explain the abundance of ILN that we observe around us. The tying of ILN to cooperative reputation, in principle, solves the problem of why people would punish
someone who violates an ILN.47 The corresponding incentives are brought about by
the self-enforcing character of cooperative reputation, that is, by the fact that it is
more expensive to hire a player with a bad reputation (if the job requires
trustworthiness). While this is the basic mechanism, it can give rise to a second
mechanism that extends the power of ILN. This second mechanism consists of

47

In the context of ILN that supply a collective good, this problem is often referred to as

“second order collective action problem”. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3
Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 1, 18 et seq. (2001) and the reference to Buchanan in n. 12 supra.
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imposing a loss in reputation on anybody who fails to punish (e.g. still cooperates
with) the transgressor. In other words, the second mechanism is itself an ILN that
requires participating in the enforcement of another norm.48 As a consequence,
partners will urge each other to abide by the norm in order to spare themselves the
conflict between losing their reputation and having to terminate the relationship. This
way, enforcement of ILN can reach an additional fraction of players who would
otherwise prefer a loss in reputation to incurring the cost of compliance.

It emerges from the three arguments that cooperative reputation can be quite a
powerful vehicle for ILN. Generally, reputation is an additional device to check
opportunism and to enhance cooperative opportunities. If players have such an additional option at their disposal they will probably use it. ILN can extract a considerable
part of the value of cooperative reputation – in fact, it can extract all the value. When
this happens individual players cannot pull back from the reputation mechanism any
more as this would mean giving up the cooperative opportunities from reputation,
which at least compensate for the ILN. Thus, players are trapped in the collective
action problem of getting rid of reputation. But much unlike other collective action
problems, this one can be beneficial: It can help to overcome other, socially harmful
collective action problems.

48

This is so because the norm is shaped by what outsiders want, and they will often prefer the

norm to have a strong effect. See c) infra. – The argument has a similar structure as E. Posner’s notion
of sanctioning as a signal (see Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 25-6 (2000)) and McAdams’
“secondary enforcement norms” (see Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation
of Norms, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338, 372-5 (1997)).
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But before reaping this result of our analysis, another condition for the enforcement of ILN deserves note, namely observability of compliance. Observability is indispensable for a reputation account of ILN: Only observable behavior can be made
subject to reputational sanctions. A less trivial point is the effect that reputation
norms have on the sharing of observations among members of a norm community. In
particular, the reputation mechanism and its network effects help explain why people
like to gossip about others’ failure to comply with social norms: Players have a strong
interest in obtaining information so as not to deal with a player who h as lost her
reputation and therefore is unreliable.
c) Internal Loss Norms and Collective Goods

A case has been made, in the preceding paragraphs, for the proposition that a
substantial amount of ILN can be sustained by tying the ILN to cooperation norms; a
person violating the ILN suffers a loss in her cooperative reputation. Now, this result
is to be applied to the kind of behavior that has always troubled norms scholars most,
the puzzle of social norms that overcome the collective action problem and produce
collective goods: Collective good norms induce people to vote, to express disapproval
of others’ littering, to pay taxes in spite of manifold occasions to evade them, and to
volunteer for honorary service (or even for the army in times of war). In all these
instances, people incur losses – sometimes very small costs, but quite substantial
costs on other occasions. If, as I have argued, the reputation theory of norms can
explain the stability of ILN then it has the key to this part of the puzzle: Collective
good norms are ILN. At the same time, they are a peculiar type of ILN: Not only do
they impose internal losses on the partners in cooperation but also do they produce
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external benefit in the form of a collective good. While the former element has been
dealt with, the latter requires further analysis. The question is this: Given that ILN
can be sustained, why would they tend to create an external good?

Reconsidering the conditions of norm stability worked out in the previous section it appears that the analysis of ILN has exploited the first condition – strong
network effects – but not the second one, preference compatibility. This second
condition provides an answer to why ILN tend to produce collective goods. Recall
again the way ILN use cooperative reputation to make players incur cost: The
behavior governed by ILN must be observed by other players. Also, at least a number
of the observers must be outsiders, that is, they must learn of the behavior although
they do not stand in a close cooperative relationship with the actor. It is these
outsiders who decide on the acting player’s reputation by judging the action as norm
compliance or violation. While partners in a cooperative relationship try to maximize
the internal benefit, outsiders neither win nor lose from the individual player. Their
only choice is between preserving the ILN and amending it or, as the case may be,
between inventing or not inventing a new ILN. It follows that, in principle, outsiders,
as decision-makers, are interested only in whether or not the norm should generally
exist and not in the implications of that decision on the particular violator. Yet outside
players are induced not only to abstract from the individual violator. Also, they are
forced to abstract from their own, purely selfish ends: Reputation norms only work if
they are applied uniformly by a relevant part of the population. Hence, a reputation
norm can only exist if it is widely accepted, and such widespread acceptance requires
that the norm favor many members of the population (preference compatibility).
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Therefore, ILN tend to be impartial towards both the players judged and the
individual players making the judgment. Effectiveness of the norm requires
consensus, consensus requires the norm to produce a collective good.49

In sum, the idea is that norms – and ILN in particular – are shaped by
unaffected outsiders who have the freedom to decide according to their true
preferences over norms in general. ILN tend to supply collective goods because most
players prefer collective goods to be produced even if that means that all players
(including themselves!) have to contribute. Note that this argument is paralleled by
the role of public opinion in political theory and by the law’s obsession to expose
powerful actors to the public.50 The intuition there is that public speech constrains the
speaker’s selfishness.

51

This intuition probably is correct for a similar reason as the

one advanced here: Defying a powerful player is an extremely costly undertaking for
other players. Therefore, as long as a powerful player acts within a small group she
may stretch the rules in her favor. But even the most powerful individual cannot
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The argument in the text is the same as the one adduced above for the preference

compatibility condition, cf. supra II.2. at 18
.
50

Straightforward examples are the right to a public trial and the publicity requirements for the

executive and legislative branch. It is a related point that people often behave differently in their capacity as consumers and citizens. In the latter role, they are often more attentive to the public good, Cass
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Col. L. Rev. 903, 923-4 (1996). Still another
application is the competitive process of science (and the risk of its being corrupted by political
preferences), see Ronald H. Coase, How Should Economists Choose?, in Coase, ed, Essays on
Economics and Economists 15, 30-1 (1995).
51

Cf. Joseph Farrell & Robert Gibbons, Cheap Talk with Two Audiences, 79 Am. Econ. Rev.

1214 (1989).
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control how an audience of thousands or millions form their opinion. Therefore, it is
on the public stage that restrictions can be imposed on powerful actors.

Another remark is in point. The idea that ILN are shaped and enforced by outsiders also has implications for the problem of observability. In the case of ILN, if the
norm is violated there is no individual victim. On the contrary, cooperation partners
who may have witnessed the violation have an incentive to acquiesce to a deviation,
split the gain, and not tell anybody.52 Thus, an ILN has a stable design only if players
outside a long-term relationship can observe norm compliance, or if the norm
provides incentives to disclose norm violations and if these incentives outweigh the
gains from transgression. In order to meet this requirement, ILN sometimes prescribe
visible behavior, such as a youth gang’s courage tests or the religious obligation of
attending public worship. However, with some ILN compliance is not publicly
observable. In these cases, players who deviate from the norm experience the fear that
their violation is revealed. That is, they experience shame. Notably, shame is not
confined to the perpetrator. Family relatives and other long-term partners are also
reluctant to expose a perpetrator’s violation. Only when the violation is publicized

52

One difficulty with such a hidden deviation is that the norm violator makes herself subject to

holdout. On the other hand, opportunism among the conspirators is alleviated if the norm sanctions acquiescence to the transgression as well or if the conspirators maintain a long-term relationship under
which both partners violate the norm.
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they detach themselves from the perpetrator if they can afford to.53 Family members
often cannot. Hence they are anxious to avoid disclosure of violations.54

Obviously, the picture painted so far remains coarse. In the context of the
present article, it is impossible to provide anything more than a rough sketch. The
optimistic message, nevertheless, is that ILN drift towards supplying collective
goods.

3. COMPARING MODELS: MCADAMS’ ESTEEM THEORY OF NORMS

By now, the main elements of the reputation theory of social norms have been
presented. The remainder of this section aims at enriching the theory further,
particularly by putting reputation theory in perspective with two prominent pieces of
norms scholarship. In this subsection, reputation theory is related to Richard
McAdams’ esteem theory of norms.55

The core assumption of esteem theory is that people have a slight preference for
something that other people can give or withhold at zero cost: esteem. McAdams
himself emphasizes that the assumption serves to eschew the collective action

53

E. Posner reports that many of Oscar Wilde’s friends were aware of his sexual orientation but

started to shun him only when it was made public, see Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 24
(2000).
54

Tragically, they even avoid publicity when they themselves are affected by a norm violation,

such as family violence and sexual abuse.
55

See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L.

Rev. 338, 355 et seq. (1997).
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problem of norm enforcement:56 Because esteem is costless it is not subject to a free
rider problem.57 McAdams exploits this assumption to deduce a number of very
interesting results: For example, although the preference for esteem is assumed to be
slight, McAdams dexterously uses it to derive even very costly norm-guided
behavior.

My point here is not to criticize those results. Instead, what worries me is that
esteem has the flavor of an ad hoc assumption. McAdams is certainly right to insist
that esteem is a ubiquitous social fact.58 Such a fact can figure as an assumption for
the theory. However, it can as well be the explanandum of such theory. In what
follows, I follow the latter path and explain esteem as an upshot of the reputation
theory presented here. Supplying a model to McAdams’ assumptions avoids some
objections against the esteem model: For instance, if esteem was costless to award,
why would not players trade it in for private benefits? That is, why would not esteem
become an ordinary good – to the ultimate effect that players would ascribe it an
opportunity cost?59 To invalidate objections like these, it may be helpful to
understand esteem as reputation. With this interpretation, McAdams’ theory is quite
compatible with the one set out here, which allows combining their results.

56

Cf. n. 47 supra.

57

See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L.

Rev. 338, 352 et seq. (1997).
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See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L.

Rev. 338, 355 (1997) and Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and
Economic Methodology, 110 Y. L. J. 625, 681 et seq. (2001).
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To see that esteem can be identified with reputation it is important to clarify the
concept of reputation. Most importantly, reputation is not necessarily an all-ornothing sanction. Consider again the Maghribi traders. Recall that a stigmatized
trader was not necessarily out of business altogether but simply cost more to his
principals. This is a hint that reputation can be seen as a matter of degree. There may
have been cheating of different severity resulting in different degrees of loss of
reputation. On markets, we are used to fine differentials in the reputation of a firm,
brand, product, or professional with nuances ranging from the world-renowned
surgery specialist to the quack. Such continuous reputation extends beyond markets.
For instance, in spite of the dualistic character of moral norms people measure moral
character in degrees, rather than using two disparate categories of “the good” and “the
evil.”

With this idea of continuous reputation in mind, McAdams’ notion of esteem
can simply be set in one with reputation as construed by reputation theory. Just as
McAdams emphasizes with respect to esteem, continuous reputation is a relative
measure. That is, one aims at earning more reputation/esteem in comparison to
others: If most people do not care for the welfare of the community as a whole then
being trustworthy in bilateral trading already earns one an average reputation.60 By
contrast, in a society of saints an average reputation is associated with a great deal of

59

Also, one wonders if more esteem from player A could substitute for player B’s esteem, and if

so, at what rate of substitution.
60

See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L.

Rev. 338, 357 (1997).
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self-denial, i.e. high costs through ILN. Also, like McAdams’ esteem, continuous
reputation can be withheld at no cost. In my analysis above I have emphasized that
only outsiders who do not incur much risk can enforce ILN.61 I presume that
McAdams would accept the same caveat for esteem: Players maintaining a valuable
cooperative relationship will be reluctant to withhold reputation/esteem. Thus, the
concepts of reputation and esteem are well compatible in this respect, too. Finally,
there is a correspondence to another one of McAdams’ assumptions: McAdams
observes that a single individual’s esteem is worth little but that esteem from many
individuals adds up to a noticeable effect.62 The same is true for reputation by virtue
of network effects: I may be perfectly happy if some single individual thinks I have
lost my reputation (or should have lost it because of what I have done). The situation
becomes worrying only if many people disrespect me so that the alleged loss of
reputation becomes self-enforcing.

61

Cf. supra III.2.c) at 34
. Obviously, there is a cost in excluding a player from future

cooperation (cf. the Kreps reference in n. 35 supra). But if the reputation mechanism works smoothly,
the cost is spread on the group as a whole. A single member of the group cannot do anything to avoid
this cost. She cannot, in other words, award reputation to other players independently from the social
norm in effect. It is for this reason that players cannot promise to award reputation in exchange for a
side-payment – which was one of the problems with McAdams’ esteem assumption, see supra at 40
text accompanying n. 59.
62

See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L.

Rev. 338, 365 (1997).
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Reputation theory is so close to McAdams’ esteem theory that his results apply
in a reputation framework, too.63 These results owe their strength to the insight that
esteem is a relative value, i.e. that one aims at being esteemed in comparison to
others. I have just demonstrated that the same is true for (continuous) reputation. One
very important implication is that sanctions increase as the number of perpetrators
drops. The reason is that the number of norm violators shrinks and thus the number of
players ranked relatively higher soars. Correspondingly, norms can exhibit selfamplification up to the point where compliance has become the standard behavior and
nobody gains any more positive reputation from complying (but merely avoids
reputational harm). These dynamics cannot only crunch a minority of deviators but
they can also cause new norms to rise. “Heroes” may trigger the emergence of a new
norm by incurring sacrifices. So long as their endeavor is that of a few dispersed
individuals their sacrifice remains futile. If they fail they are ridiculed. However, if
they succeed they trigger a competition for compliance up to the point where the
proposal has become the new standard. One crucial condition of success for a hero is
to be a “norm entrepreneur” at the same time, that is, to convey to their audience why
the new behavior is useful and thus deserves esteem (or reputation). Hence the
mixture of eloquence and resoluteness that accounts for charismatic leadership.

While reputation theory greatly benefits from esteem theory it is, on the other
hand, more comprehensive than esteem theory. The most important point certainly is

63

See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L.

Rev. 338, 365 et seq. (1997).
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that reputation theory explains rather than assumes reputation/esteem. Yet this is not
the only point where reputation theory can stretch reductionism further.64 Another is
gossip. As other players are eager to keep track of a player’s reputation there is no
need to premise gossip on an intrinsic pleasure, as McAdams does.65 Gossiping is
nothing else than an exchange of information needed to adjust the amount of trust one
can place into others. Similarly, reputation theory explains the consensus that
McAdams requires as a condition of a norm.66

To conclude, McAdams’ norms theory based on esteem adds important insights
for reputation theory, while reputation theory may help identify the forces driving
reputation/esteem. In explaining norms, the two theories can be considered as
complements rather than substitutes.

4. COMPARING MODELS: E. POSNER’S SIGNALING THEORY OF NORMS

Eric Posner has worked out an impressive theory of norms based on the idea of
costly signaling.67 Like McAdams, Posner follows the rational choice path in ana-

64

However, for McAdams’ criticism of excessive reductionism see the reference in n. 7 supra.
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See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L.

Rev. 338, 362 (1997) as opposed to supra at 34
.
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See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L.

Rev. 338, 358-9 (1997). – Under reputation theory, a uniform norm is an implication of the network
effects of reputation norms, cf. II.1. and II.2. supra at 14 et seq.
67

See only Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (2000).
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lyzing social norms.68 However, while McAdams’ model is a complement to
reputation theory, Posner’s theory is a substitute.

Generally speaking, signaling is a costly behavior that conveys some piece of
model- exogenous private information in a credible way. Because it relies on modelexogenous information it stands in the same camp as reputation based on model-exogenous information that I have discussed above (reputation of the first type).69 Like in
the case of reputation based on model-exogenous information, the signaling player
knows a particular variable that only she can observe. Other players would like to
cooperate with the sender only if the variable has the “good” value; otherwise, the
other players prefer not to cooperate. Consider again the hypothetical of the sellers
with the good and the bad production technology.70 As we have seen, good sellers can
demonstrate their superior technology by delivering high quality to all customers.
This would commonly be called reputation (based on model-exogenous information).
By contrast, a signal might consist of offering one delivery for free in order to
demonstrate quality, or of making a binding promise to take back any good that a
customer may wish to return.

Posner uses the signaling framework to explain social norms. In doing so, he
has to choose which model-exogenous information to assume for the model, i.e. the
information conveyed by the signal. For this purpose, Posner chooses players’

68

In a way, he is even more a rational choice scholar than McAdams because he attempts (as I

do) to treat social norms without resorting to normative motivations.
69

See supra 1. at 23.
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preferences with respect to consumption over time, i.e. their discount rates.71 A
person with a high discount rate prefers present consumption to future consumption
relatively more than a person with a low discount rate. Consequently, a person with a
high discount rate is less trustworthy because she values the loss of a relationship or a
punishment in the future relatively less than a person with a low discount rate. Thus,
Posner distinguishes bad cooperative types (high discount rate) from good
cooperative types (low discount rate). With that assumption in place, the signaling
framework is ready to be applied on the subject of norms: Behavior guided by social
norms is, according to Posner, costly and visible signaling that is intended to
demonstrate the sender’s good type.72

Posner’s signaling approach is especially attractive when it is compared to the
difficulties that reputation theory had in coping with ILN. As we have seen, ILN must
prevent the players from abolishing the ILN, which would enable them to retain more
value for themselves. Posner does not explicitly address norm stability – simply because he does not have to. He can afford to ignore the problem because the signaling

70

See supra at 23.

71

See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 18-9 (2000). In a paper with Professor Goldsmith

on international relations, Posner offers “political stability” as a private information to be signaled. See
Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational
Choice Perspective, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Papers (2d series) No 108, 8 (Chicago,
2000).
72

More precisely, a norm is “a description of the behavior that emerges in … signaling

equilibriums.” The latter definition includes cheap behavior that does not serve as a signal but avoids
being punished by others who signal by punishing deviations, see Eric A. Posner, Law and Social
Norms 24-6 (2000).
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approach is immune to it: Players cannot agree to abolish a signaling ILN because
they need signaling to overcome a problem of asymmetric information.

This short summary of Posner’s signaling model highlights why it must be a
substitute, not a complement to the reputation theory of norms. Reputation in the
narrow sense I use the term here is not based on model-exogenous information;
instead, it is a social construct entirely.73 Posner’s signaling model is on the opposite
side. Therefore, the two approaches substitute for each other. Posner’s model is better
suited whenever we think that there is a relevant piece of private information, which
cooperative partners need to know and which can, at the same time, be conveyed in a
credible way by means of a costly signal. Both conditions must be met for the
signaling account to work. If they are not then reputation theory is the only option.

It is at this point that the critique against signaling theory should be taken into
account.74 One argument strikes me as particularly important. I have said that the
signaling model must assume model-exogenous information that is at the same time
relevant for cooperation and suitable to be signaled. This is already a significant

73

As has been discussed at some length supra under III.1. at 23
.

74

A lot of the critique stems from Posner’s decision to rely on one single piece of information –

the discount rate – as the signal’s message. See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law,
Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 Y. L. J. 625, 654-663 (2001) and Paul G. Mahoney, Norms
and Signals: Some Skeptical Observations, 36 U. Rich. L. Rev. 387 (2002) (suggesting that the less
well-off would have a greater need to show their reliability). Yet it seems Posner would be willing to
accept a different interpretation, cf. n. 71 supra. Under such an understanding, the work of other
authors can also be ascribed to the signaling approach to social norms. For instance, not committing
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limitation. But even if these conditions obtain there must, incrementally, not be a
cheaper alternative to signaling in order to credibly convey information.75 One
obvious candidate is a cooperative reputation norm.76 To cite one of Posner’s
examples, if people’s donating to the opera is a signal that serves to facilitate
cooperation, then it must be impossible to achieve the same result through
cooperative reputation. If the donator wants to make private friends it would be better
for her to show how well she cooperates with the friends she already has because, that
way, she would not only signal but at the same time enhance the value of her existing
friendships – instead wasting money on the opera. Of course, cooperative reputation
may not be an option. It may be that cooperative behavior is not observable well
enough, or a newcomer may not yet have cooperative relations.77 One implication is
that we would expect signaling at an initial stage, say, when entering a new market.
Later, we would expect it to give way to cooperative reputation.78

crimes can be seen as a signal of high productivity. See Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling
Expectations of Criminality, 39 J. L. & Econ. 519 (1996).
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See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic

Methodology, 110 Y. L. J. 625, 677 (2001).
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See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic

Methodology, 110 Y. L. J. 625, 674-676 (2001).
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A donator may seek for a public role and thus be interested in the broad visibility of a

donation. Yet this hardly explains donations from all those with a more narrow audience.
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See Paul G. Mahoney, Norms and Signals: Some Skeptical Observations, 36 U. Rich. L. Rev.

387, 391-2 (2002) (for small groups). – Of course, Posner anticipates this objection. He responds by
pointing to weak memories, insufficient flow of information, and changing outside conditions, see Eric
A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 20-1 (2000). The problem I see with this argument is that signaling
becomes especially expensive if it is used persistently. Hence, there is a strong incentive to come up
with an alternative to persistent signaling. To be sure, a reputation driven ILN is equally expensive.
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Another cheaper substitute for signaling can be private or public memory. Provided that the information conveyed by the signal does not change, it seems cheaper
to store that information, be it in one’s head or through gossip.79 This substitute
should be available at least for small and close groups where information flow is
good.

The point is that signaling has to rule out alternatives, and that its applicability
will be limited. Note that, by contrast, reputation theory confronts norm stability
directly. Therefore, if a reputation ILN can be shown to be stable because of network
effects and preference compatibility, it cannot be contracted around. By the same
token, it need not compete with other arrangements that may be more attractive for
the cooperative partners.

IV. Examples

So far, the reputation theory of social norms has been presented on a theoretical
level. To vivify the picture, a few examples may be helpful. In the context of this
exploratory paper, I will not take such “hypotheses testing” very far but some of it

But the reputation theory proposed here is backed up by an account of norm stability, which constrains
players’ ability to get rid of it.
79

Mahoney perceives a somewhat different problem for signaling theory. In his view the fact

that information conveyed by signals is valuable should lead to information trading. From the fact that
such trading rarely takes place he concludes that signaling cannot be as important as Posner believes.
See Paul G. Mahoney, Norms and Signals: Some Skeptical Observations, 36 U. Rich. L. Rev. 387,
394-6 (2002).
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will be helpful to make the point. The examples offered aim at providing an intuition
of how the reputation theory of norms plays out in concrete analysis.

1. PRIVATE PROVISION OF COLLECTIVE GOODS: DONATING AND VOLUNTEERING

The first example of a norm that I consider through the lens of reputation theory
is donating and volunteering. It is astonishing from a rational choice perspective that
people donate or volunteer for helping the poor, for protecting the environment, for
improving education, and for providing other collective goods. The challenge is
exacerbated by the fact that donating and volunteering is an expensive activity. It
cannot be played down to a minor defect of rationality resulting in some negligible
loss.

Of course, “voluntary” contributions to collective goods are precisely what the
concept of ILN is designed to capture. Thus, explaining those oddities (from a
rational choice perspective) does not demand more than applying the framework of
stable reputation ILN. However, the intuition behind this solution may be somewhat
hard to grasp. For instance, we rarely find a norm requiring to shun people who do
not donate a certain standard portion of their income. But as we have seen, reputation
must be thought of as a continuous variable.80 Accordingly, a reputation norm is not a
rigid threshold that either awards or withholds reputation. Rather, a reputation norm
should be conceived of as a function assigning a reputation value to a multi-

80

As I argued earlier, reputation can explain most of the properties that McAdams ascribes to

his esteem assumption. Cf. supra III.3. at 38
.
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dimensional vector of activities. That function determines whether activities are
substitutes for or complements to each other. Activities like donating or volunteering
are complements to a bunch of more basic behavioral patterns such as refraining from
criminal activity, from being polite to others, not cheating on them, etc. It certainly
does not pay in terms of reputation to donate generously to the local museum while
being caught stealing in the supermarket. Conversely, the various possibilities for
contributing to collective goods are substitutes. It does not matter so much, as far as
general reputation is concerned,81 whether you donate to the museum or to Greenpeace. Probably, you even do not need to donate at all as long as you contribute in
some other way, e.g. by participating in the political process or by showing interest in
cultural developments. However – and this is the main proposition of reputation
theory – a person without any such commitment to the common good will be less
esteemed, considered boring, less valued as a friend or conversation partner, less
attractive on the marriage market, and so forth.

So far, the story told by reputation theory does not sound different from that of
signaling theory. In Posner’s view, donating serves people as a signal of being a
cooperative type.82 I have already mentioned one important limitation of signaling,
namely that it should often be defeated by cooperative reputation, especially when

81

I speak of general reputation to distinguish it from reputation with a particular group. Of

course, a benefactor of the local museum will enjoy a particular reputation among those interested in
the arts.
82

See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 50 et seq. and 65-67 (2000).
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one already has many cooperative ties.83 By contrast, a reputation norm can
persistently extract expenditures and effort from the player; they have to comply or
else they lose their reputation.

Also, reputation theory yields additional predictions compared to signaling
theory (making it both richer and more susceptible to falsification). At first sight it
seems that a signal need only be costly.84 Still, Posner realizes that the institutions
funded by private donations perform particular services, and that signaling theory
would remain incomplete without explaining why, apparently, burning cash does not
substitute for donating. Posner responds by introducing another requirement for a
signal, namely that it attract attention. It is for this reason, Posner argues, that money
is given to attractive and spectacular projects.

I do not doubt that this point is highly relevant. Visibility and attracting attention is important for a reputation account, too.85 Still, it falls short of explaining many
forms of giving that seem not to maximize visibility. It is telling that Posner uses the
opera as an illustration instead of, say, charity.86 While the former is entertaining and
can be seen as satisfying intrinsic preferences, the latter is beneficial for society but
not particularly interesting for the audience it aims at: People devote time and money
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Supra at 48.
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At one point, Posner posits that “any costly action can be a signal” (Eric A. Posner, Law and

Social Norms 24 (2000), emphasis added). Cf. Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law,
Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 Y. L. J. 625, 640 (2001).
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to go to the opera but not to watch a charitable organization feed the poor. Reputation
theory, on the other hand, would predict that if donating to a particular cause is
sufficiently visible then stable ILN will foster the provision of collective goods over
social waste. In other words, the theory presented here unambiguously disqualifies
burning money as a means of raising one’s reputation – even if the fire was highly
visible. Moreover, reputation theory predicts that the receivers of givings correspond
to the welfare of the particular group, in which the respective donor aspires to
reputation. Even though it is sometimes hard to tell whom a donator seeks to impress
some cases are quite clear: It is not surprising that companies donate for their
pressure groups or that law firms tend to support law schools (rather than, say, the
protection of bio-diversity). The next subsection considers a case of selfish groups
with a potentially devastating effect on society as a whole.

2. SELFISH GROUPS: RACISM

Under reputation theory, players contribute to collective goods because
outsiders are relatively free to award or withhold reputation. Outsiders use this
freedom to foster the collective goods that they appreciate but, without reputation
norms, would not be supplied due to the collective action problem. It is clear from
this analysis that if all relevant outsiders belong to a particular subset of the
population the resulting norms will reflect their interest as a group, not that of society
as a whole. Thus, if a certain type of transaction gives rise to a distinct type of
reputation and if the transaction is confined to a particular subset of players, the
respective group will harness its reputation norm to pursue its own selfish group
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interest. It is not unlikely that such selfish groups impose externalities on other
groups or on society as a whole.

Racism is a striking example for selfish group behavior. Again, it is instructive
to compare the reputation theory account to that of Posner’s signaling model. Posner
sees discriminating on the basis of race as a costly act that can signal the racist’s low
discount rate. By contrast, McAdams has pointed to the fact that racist ideology often
emphasizes the inferiority of the discriminated group. This, McAdams argues, is at
odds with Posner’s requirement that a signal appear costly (the more costly the
better!); foregoing cooperation with inferior people does not cost much.87

Reputation theory has little difficulty in explaining racism, including the
alleged superiority of the racist’s own race. At variance with the signaling model,
reputation theory predicts that it is easier to convince others of a racist norm if those
discriminated against are not attractive cooperation partners. This is so because the
less costly a reputation norm is the more easily it is implemented. As an example,
take discrimination against African-Americans in the South of the United States.
Given the relatively poor education of most African-Americans, whites did not forego
large gains from cooperation when they declined to employ African-Americans in
well-paid positions. On the other hand, racism did allow hiring African-Am
ericans

87

See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic

Methodology, 110 Y. L. J. 625, 651-653 (2001). – To counter this objection, Posner argues that
debasing the worth of individuals of the other race actually emphasizes the cost of discrimination by
clarifying that discrimination is not a matter of indulging an individual taste. See Eric A. Posner, Law
and Social Norms 139 (2000).
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for physical work. Thus, the racism norm effectively created a white cartel for wellpaid employment, which is a very obvious case of selfish group behavior.88

Yet reputation theory has to overcome a difficulty in explaining racism that
signaling theory does not face. Reputation theory usually predicts norms to be of a
general character.89 Racism, by contrast, consists of discriminating against a subset of
the population. Therefore, reputation theory predicts that racism must create a norm
network that applies only to members of the racist’s own race. That is, racism must
create a separate group based on race distinctions and having a distinct reputation
mechanism. Simultaneously, race boundaries must seem fixed lest other groups fear
becoming the next target. Both conditions were easily met in the South of the United
States as slavery had secluded African-Americans from the white population anyway.
By contrast, the Nazis had to launch a long propaganda campaign to gain support for
their racist assaults on German Jews. Although they could build on a long history of
discrimination against Jews, their ultimate success in establishing their racist ideology
turned on the fact that they obtained control of the government.

3. HIDDEN BENEFITS: FENCING DUELS IN GERMAN STUDENT FRATERNITIES

Racism conforms to reputation theory in that it benefits a selfish group by
creating a cartel among its members. By contrast, a more serious challenge to
reputation theory is ILN that seem not to benefit anybody. Reputation theory predicts

88

See Andreas Moro & Peter Norman, A General Equilibrium Model of Statistical

Discrimination, SSRN Working Paper 18 et seq. (2002).
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that outside players in principle will use reputation to encourage supply of collective
goods. This proposition is hard to reconcile with costly norms that seem not to
produce any gain. To defend reputation theory for these cases requires showing that
the norm, contrary to appearances, does produce a collective good for society or for
the group holding the norm.

Fencing duels in German student fraternities provide an example.90 The duels
are an ancient tradition going back to the emergence of the fraternities in the first half
of the 19th century. At variance with aristocratic dueling in Europe or the Southern
States of the US, the fraternity duels mostly are not a sanction for an insult. Rather,
they are conducted on a regular basis. Fighting a number of these duels is a
mandatory requirement for student members of the fraternity. Students who decline to
fight are expelled from the fraternity. While there are practically no lethal incidences
in the duels, members frequently sustain injuries. Usually, these injuries are of a
minor character but they sometimes cause lasting and visible scars. The rules of the
duels deliberately exacerbate this risk by disallowing protection gear. Student
members sometimes undertake to abolish or to evade the duels. Such attempts usually
fail because senior members – who provide the funding for the fraternity – oppose the
change.

89
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See supra at 21.
In 1953 the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) ruled the duels to be

permissible, ending a long-lasting debate. Even in this decision, the court suspected the duels of
maintaining the customs and perhaps privileges of the upper class. See 1953 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 473.
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It is hard to see any benefit from the fencing duels for the members of the
fraternities. On the contrary, the risk that members suffer lasting injuries seems to be
a mere cost to the community, not to speak of the individual member. This suggests
turning to the signaling model, which does not postulate that a norm benefits the
group holding it. In the signaling framework, dueling may figure as a present cost on
student members. Imposing such a cost may help to sort out members with a high
discount rate who are too impatient to bear it. There is a problem though with this
analysis. While being hurt in a duel inflicts present cost in the form of pain and other
inconveniences it also imposes disutility in the future through the visible scar.91 This
cost structure significantly departs from signaling theory because signaling discount
rates requires discriminating as much as possible between present and future cost.92
The deviation from the ideal signaling cost structure does not come about
accidentally. Rather, the fraternities that hold on to the tradition expressly deny
adequate gear that would protect against disfigure ment.93

Since signaling seems not to provide a fully satisfactory answer, it is
worthwhile to reconsider potential benefits for the group that would make it
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Having a scar in one’s face used to be a clear indication of fraternity membership, which, at

least in former times, was an advantage. This should not, however, lead one to conclude that scars
were actually a (direct) source of utility. Rather, a norms theory must explain why a disfigurement that
causes displeasure nonetheless confers a social advantage.
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It could be argued that present cost predominates in the form of fear. However, there are

many other ways of inflicting fear without risking long-term harm.
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It seems to me that there is a number of norm-induced activities that put at risk future utility.

For instance, while drug consumption is often thought of as lack of self-discipline there is also the
story that drug consumption is a signal for courage and independence.
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consistent with a reputation account of the dueling norm. In fact, the dueling norm
may have a hidden benefit for the members of the fraternity. These benefits can only
be seen by considering the overall economic structure of the fraternity. One important
part of the deal is generous support to student members, especially in the form of
cheap housing and subsidized leisure activities. Since the fraternity is funded by its
senior members it must be cautious to deter free riders who reap the benefits without
being prepared to provide financial support after graduation. This free rider problem
offers a simple explanation for diverging interests between student and senior members with respect to the duels. However, the free rider problem does not explain the
duels. As such, an “entry fee” may keep students from acceding to the fraternity but it
can hardly prevent them from behaving opportunistically once they have paid the fee
and reaped the benefits.

It is at this point that the second good provided by the fraternity comes into
play. The fraternities do not confine themselves to supporting its student members. In
addition to that, they are a network of trust for advice, assistance, and friendship.
Fraternity members support each other in various ways after graduation. They form a
network of professional as well as private contacts. Such cooperation rests on a high
level of trust. Another way to put this is that the fraternity creates its own peculiar
type of reputation. Such a peculiar reputation, or higher level of trust, must be
safeguarded against hit-and-run strategies. Therefore, membership in the fraternity
must not be cheap so as to discourage opportunistic behavior beforehand. The reason
why fencing duels are good for the fraternity, thus, is the following: By extracting an
“entry fee”, the fencing duels force new members to invest into the fraternity. Later,
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those members will live up to their obligations within the fraternity because this is the
only way not to lose this investment.94

In sum, reputation theory appears twice in the analysis: On a first level,
reputation theory explains that the duels are maintained (in spite of the fact that some
members would benefit from abolishing them). The explanation, however, rests on
the condition that there is a benefit for the fraternity as a whole. The second level of
analysis finds this benefit in the cooperative trust within the fraternity. The
maintenance of a strong cooperative reputation norm is a collective good that must be
preserved by imposing the duels as an “entry fee” on new members.

V. Conclusions

Communication and information impact on people’s norms and values. This is
not only a republican ideal. It is a reality experienced by all kinds of political and
religious groups, parents, politicians, and other “norm entrepreneurs.” To account for
the prominent role of communication, in my view, is one of the key advantages to be
expected of reputation theory. I cannot see how a behavioral theory of norms was
able to explain the substantial role of communication: It is quite plausible that people
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The idea is that people can acquire a reputation in the first place by making a sacrifice that

seems unrelated to the type of cooperation that reputation is meant to facilitate. The same logic applies
where reputation is sold, for instance in the form of goodwill associated with a firm or brand. See
David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in Alt & Shepsle, ed, Perspectives on
Positive Political Economy 90, 108-11 (1990), Steven Tadelis, What's in a Name? Reputation as a
Tradeable Asset, 89 Am. Econ. Rev. 548 (1999), and Steven Tadelis, The Market for Reputations as an
Incentive Mechanism, 110 J. Pol. Ec. 854 (2002).
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obey norms from force of habit or internalization; but there is little in the way of
predicting which norms will come to be internalized or accustomed to.95 By contrast,
if norms are here because they lift rational indeterminacy, it is natural that
communication – the act of producing common knowledge96 – is of great relevance.
The ways in which people shape norms in public and private discourse is a deserving
subject for further study.

Beside positive and instrumental analysis, there is also a normative gist to
norms theorizing. It has been inferred, from the existence of norms, that individuals
have only rather limited capability for autonomous self-determination.97 Thus, it has
been argued that in the virtually all-encompassing realm of norms, preference autonomy cannot be used as a baseline for normative analysis. To refute, at least weaken,
this argument, it has to be shown that norms are well consistent with rational choice –
rational choice being at the heart of preference autonomy. This, in my view, is also an
important point to be made in favor of reputation theory (as well as for all other
rational choice accounts of social norms).

On the other hand, the normative implications may not be that far-reaching.98
Although a rational choice explanation of norms helps defend anti-paternalism, it
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E. Posner raises a related point when he says that internalization lacks a well-developed

theory of how and when feelings of guilt occur, see Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 43 (2000).
96

See n. 19 supra.

97

See the references in n. 2 supra at 1 .

98

See the comparison between the two camps in Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social

Norms, 3 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 1, 30 et seq. (2001).

- 59 -

cannot dismiss the possibility of inefficient norms. True, reputation theory does offer
some reason for being optimistic in this regard: If people can speak out about their
preferences, reputation norms tend towards enhancing efficiency.99 However, nothing
guarantees that the players who can influence the norm comprise the whole
population. If they constitute only a subset of the population, the group’s interest need
not coincide with the welfare of society as a whole, or with that of other groups.
Conflicts between groups can be especially grave when it comes to issues of
distribution. In such cases, supporting one’s own group can earn one reputation. We
have seen that racism is a natural application of this theory.100 It follows that, at this
level of generality, the theory cannot determine if norms will lead to efficient
results.101 Thus, it seems that saving rational choice as a foundation of norms analysis
would buy us only little: Instead of arguing that people do not possess genuine
preferences at all, advocates of strong government can invoke the (allegedly)
detrimental effect of some inefficient norm. Also, government intervention against
bad norms may be justified even against the protest of those individuals who suffer
from the norm: A norm may be so entrenched that even its victims are forced to
oppose change. One example is gender roles in certain cultural environments where
women are barred from education. In spite of their inferior role, many women assert
that they are content with their cultural background, including their role. Even if

99

At least, they tend towards eliminating inferior norms. It is a different matter if there is

sufficient supply for efficient norms.
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paternalism cannot be defended theoretically, we may have, in such situations, strong
grounds for government intervention as if paternalism was legitimate.

Thus, even under a rational choice theory of social norms it may be hard to
establish if an individual’s statement reflects her preferences, or if it is forced on her
by a norm. The goal to distinguish the two possibilities leads us to favor certain
democratic rules of procedure, which shield the influence of detrimental norms to the
best extent possible. To provide procedural rules like secret voting is, therefore, one
normative implication of rational choice norms analysis. Where such rules are
infeasible, rational choice and preference autonomy at least instructs the analyst to
conduct a normative gedankenexperiment: If we subtracted the particular norms
affecting an individual, what norms would she choose to live under? To pursue this
question both defines and advises a research agenda for normative “law and norms:”
That norms are the result of communication and rational choice, and nothing more,
tells us what to substract, and hence what to look for.
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